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The	Himalayan	country	of	Nepal,	long	romanticized	by	anthropologists	and	other	
social	scientists	as	an	untouched	‘Himalayan	Paradise’,	embedded	in	sedentary	
bias,	has	been	going	through	a	tumultuous	socio‐political	changes	in	the	last	few	
decades.	Following	the	consolidation	by	Hindu	King	Prithivi	Narayan	Shah	and	
his	followers	to	cope	with	the	unusual	heterogeneity	of	the	cultural	and	political	
traditions	since	1976,	Nepali	State	has	gone	through	a	series	of	significant	socio‐
political	transformations	in	the	past	200	years.	With	the	restoration	of	multi‐
party	democracy	in	1990,	the	10	year	old	Maoist	people’s	war,	expansion	of	
Nepal’s	public	sphere	including	media,	wide	spread	migration	communications	
and	civil	society,	overthrowing	of	monarchy	and	declaring	of	Nepal	as	a	republic	
as	well	as	a	secular	state,	emergence	and	consolidation	of	identity	politics	and	
the	debate	on	state	restructuring	and	federalism,	Nepal	is	going	through	a	major	
political	transition.	More	recently,	Nepal’s	Constituent	Assembly	was	dissolved	
on	27	May	2012	because	an	agreement	could	not	be	reached	on	the	nature	of	the	
federal	structure	due	to	stark	disagreements	on	the	nature	of	the	federal	
structure	between	the	Maoists	and	identity	groups	on	the	one	hand	and	rest	of	
the	political	parties	on	the	other	hand.	
	
There	is	very	little	constructive	academic	debate	on	the	current	socio‐political	
transition	in	Nepal	except	for	a	few	journalistic	commentary	and	reports	
supported	by	donors	that	either	paint	the	picture	of	Nepal	as	a	failing	or	failed	
state	or	romanticize	the	revival	of	ethnic	and	regional	politics	as	a	process	of	
democratization.	This	paper	takes	an	issue	with	social	scientists	for	failing	to	
engage	with	contentious	issues	such	as	federalism	debate	instead	leaving	it	to	
contrasting	populist	discourses.	It	is	not	my	primary	purpose	to	evaluate	the	
historical	or	ethnographic	evidence	on	some	of	the	most	contentious	issues	
including	the	diagnosis	of	state‐society	relations	in	Nepal	and	offer	prescriptions,	
for	which	there	are	plenty	of	activists,	pundits,	donors	and	consultants	in	
Kathmandu,	but	to	critique	this	particular	epistemic	assemblage	for	failing	to	
comprehend	some	of	the	basic	questions	facing	Nepali	society.		How	should	
social	scientists	engage	on	issues	such	as	ethnicity	and	state	structure?	What	is	
the	role	of	anthropologists	and	historians	when	the	knowledge	that	they	produce	
is	used	for	the	purpose	of	making	claims	on	ethnic	federalism?	Should	the	social	
scientists	accept	the	fixed	ethnic	categories	used	by	the	activists,	state	and	aid	
donors,	or	should	they	adopt	a	more	critical	perspective	on	the	social	
construction	of	identities	and	fluidity	of	boundaries,	and	the	role	of	academics,	
activists,	analysts,	donors	and	short‐term	consultants,	who	sustain	such	a	
representation?	I	argue	that	the	current	political	impasse	in	Nepal	is	worrying,	
not	because	Nepal	is	turning	into	a	failed	state	as	some	Western	scholars	and	
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media	have	often	claimed	including	a	recent	piece	in	the	New	York	Times1,	but	
because	of	the	academic	silence	of	social	scientists	working	in	Nepal	who	fail	to	
acknowledge	the	fluid	boundaries	of	ethnicity	as	well	as	changing	nature	of	
Nepali	society	but	are	instead	caught	in	the	timeless	and	sedentary	imagination	
of	Nepal.	If	the	current	political	impasse	ought	to	break,	we	will	need	a	rigorous	
and	informed	public	debate	on	how	has	the	Nepali	state	and	society	been	
changing	over	the	last	200	plus	years.		
	
Nepali	State	
In	the	post‐1990	era,	anthropologists	and	other	social	scientists,	both	‘foreign’	
and	‘Nepali’,	have	studied	state‐society	relations	and	highlighted	the	ethnic	
dimension	of	the	Nepali	state.	The	most	authoritative	criticism	focused	on	the	
exclusionary	nature	of	the	Nepali	state,	dominated	by	what	some	social	scientists	
have	categorized	‘Parbatiyas’	i.e.	member	of	the	hill	caste	groups	that	has	always	
been	Nepali	speaking	(Gellner	et	al.,	1997,	Lawoti,	2005).	Starting	with	King	
Prithvi	Narayan	Shah,	the	Nepali	state	has	defined	itself	against	external	threats,	
especially	the	rising	British	Empire,	while	trying	to	be	a	pure	Hindu	land	at	
home.		Prior	to	1769,	Nepal	was	divided	into	many	autonomous	petty	states.	
Prithvi	Narayan	Shah	and	his	successors	started	integrating	Nepal	into	a	single	
nation	with	an	ambition	to	establish	“asal	Hindustan”	or	true	Hindu	land	
(Whelpton,	2005).	Although	the	dominant	Nepali	nationalists	continue	to	feel	
proud	of	the	moves	of	King	P.	N.	Shah	and	his	successors	towards	creating	a	
greater	Nepal	and	strategically	resisting	the	external	threat,	his	critics	see	his	
aim	to	create	“asal	Hindusthan”	as	a	way	of	marginalising	the	non‐Hindu	caste	
groups	(Gurung,	1997,	Whelpton,	2005).		
	
Nepal	came	under	the	Rana	regime	for	104	years	(1846‐1950)	through	a	coup	
called	kot	parba	(courtyard	massacre).	In	the	Rana	period	Nepal	allowed	itself	to	
be	the	semi‐colony	of	British	Empire	(Blaikie	et	al.,	2001).	The	Ranas	got	
exposure	to	western	ideas	and	institutions	through	contact	with	the	British	
Empire.	One	of	the	outcomes	was	the	Muluki	Ain	(National	Code),	which	was	
enforced	in	1854	legitimizing	the	caste	system,	gender	hierarchy	and	superiority	
of	the	Hindu	religion	(Whelpton,	2005).	Although	the	concept	of	the	code	is	said	
to	be	inspired	by	western	ideas	following	the	visit	of	Rana	Prime	Minister	Jung	
Bahadur	to	Europe,	the	content	was	largely	functional	to	the	interests	of	
dominant	elites	that	were	important	for	supporting	the	regime.		Overall,	the	pre‐
1951	rulers	put	Nepal	under	a	Hindu	ritual	framework.		Pfaff‐Czarnecka	(Pfaff‐
Czarnecka,	1997:	425)	offers	the	following	analysis:	
“From	the	point	of	view	of	rulers,	the	plurality	of	Nepali	society	was	
conceived	of	within	the	uniform	socio‐political	framework.	Rather	than	
seeking	to	establish	national	unity	through	a	vision	of	a	culturally	
homogenous	population,	the	rulers	sought	to	define	a	national	identity	
which	allowed	for	cultural	variation	but	which	had	Hinduism	as	its	major	
pillar	”	
	
When	India	became	independent	from	British	rule,	and	the	Rana	regime	
																																																								
1	See	an	op‐ed	by	Seyom	Brown	and	Vanda	Felbab‐Brown	titled	‘Nepal,	on	the	Brink	of	Collapse’,	
5	June	2012.	Available	at:	http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/opinion/nepal‐on‐the‐brink‐
of‐collapse.html	
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subsequently	ended,	the	Shah	rulers	attempted	to	promote	one	nation	sharing	a	
common	culture	in	the	post‐1951	era.	Their	major	strategies	were:	equality	of	
citizens	under	the	law	(although	the	caste	system	was	not	explicitly	abolished),	a	
modern	administrative	system,	elections,	welcoming	of	foreign	aid	and	a	project	
of	modern	development	aimed	at	turning	former	subjects	into	citizens.	In	its	
effort	to	promote	nationalism	based	on	cultural	unity,	the	government	mobilized	
the	concept	of	development	(bikas):	physical	infrastructure	such	as	road	and	air	
transport,	radio,	education	system	and	administrative	system	privileging	Nepali	
language	among	others.		
	
More	recently,	in	the	post	1990	era,	Nepal	is	experiencing	a	surge	in	identity	
politics	leading	up	to	demands	for	ethnic	federalism	that	challenges	the	unitary	
image	of	Nepal.	The	new	constitution	in	1990	enabled	the	formation	and	
mobilization	of	organizations	representing	regional,	caste,	linguistic	and	ethnic	
identities.	The	significant	political	events	since	1990,	coupled	with	the	growth	
and	proliferation	of	different	media,	civil	society,	Maoist	insurgency	and	ethnic	
and	non‐	governmental	organizations	have	transformed	the	character	of	Nepal’s	
public	sphere	(Onta,	2002).	Whereas	the	government	during	the	Panchayat	era	
monopolized	radio	Nepal,	there	was	a	media	boom	in	the	years	after	1990,	as	
newspapers	and	FM	stations	multiplied,	offering	different	perspectives	from	
across	the	political	spectrum	(Onta,	2002).		
	
Following	10	years	of	the	Maoist	insurgency	as	well	as	the	coup	by	King	
Gyanendra,	the	Maoists	and	the	alliance	of	seven	democratic	parties	forced	King	
to	give	up	power	and	a	Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement	(CPA)	was	signed	in	
2006.	Reflecting	the	sentiments	of	ethnic	minorities	and	those	who	fought	
against	the	Hindu	monarchy,	the	new	government	declared	Nepal	a	secular	state.		
Despite	much	controversy	and	postponement,	Constituent	Assembly	(CA)	
elections	were	held	in	April	2008	that	elected	one	of	the	most	diverse	and	
inclusive	parliaments	in	Nepal’s	history.	An	interesting	outcome	of	the	elections	
was	the	emergence	of	regional	identity	based	parties	that	represent	the	
grievances	and	aspirations	of	the	people	of	the	Tarai	(lowlands	bordering	India).	
Immediately	after	the	elections,	on	28	May	2008,	the	new	parliament	declared	
Nepal	a	“federal	democratic	republic.”	Nepal’s	CA	parliament	was	tasked	to	write	
a	new	constitution	by	28	May	2010,	which	had	been	extended	until	27	May	2012,	
representing	the	perceived	grievances	and	wishes	of	one	of	the	world’s	most	
diverse	and	complex	societies.	As	indicated	earlier,	Nepal’s	Constituent	Assembly	
was	dissolved	dramatically	on	27	May	2012	following	stark	differences	between	
those	supporting	ethnicity‐based	federalism	versus	those	who	did	not	support	
such	a	state	structure.		
	
There	is	now	an	imagined	idea	of	‘new	Nepal’	(or	Naya	Nepal)	based	on	plural	
notions	of	existence	of	ethnicities	based	on	different	region,	language,	religion	
and	cultures.	The	efforts	to	a	more	plural	notion	of	the	Nepali	nation	received	a	
significant	push	as	the	Maoists	together	with	various	ethnic	groups	put	issues	of	
ethnic	state	structure	in	the	centre	of	the	political	and	constitutional	debate.	
With	the	declaration	of	Nepal	as	a	secular	state	and	monarchy	abolished,	the	
ongoing	political	movements	focus	on	changing	the	rules	of	the	game	through	
federalism,	affirmative	action	and	other	provisions	to	promote	equal	
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representation	of	the	citizens	in	the	state	structure.		
	
Social	Change	
Apart	from	these	significant	socio‐political	developments,	there	is	clear	evidence	
of	a	qualitative	‘step‐change’	in	the	way	Nepali	society	is	organized	that	is	
beyond	the	“normal”	processes	of	incremental	change	that	are	always	at	work.		
	
Based	on	a	field	research	since	2007	(Sharma	and	Donini,	2010,	Sharma	and	
Donini,	2012),	we	found	many	existing	social	norms	and	patterns	are	being	
challenged	and	many	are	being	reconstructed.	Two	most	important	forms	of	
visible	transformations	in	rural	Nepal	include:	‘increased	awareness	and	
education’	and	‘increased	collective	agency	of	discriminated	groups’.	Dalits	and	
women	we	spoke	to	repeatedly	emphasized	that	‘they	had	become	aware’	and	
their	‘sense	of	confidence	and	self‐esteem	had	increased	considerably’.	Perhaps	
the	most	important	‘step‐change’	is	seen	in	the	caste	domain	where	there	has	
been	significant	reduction	in	discriminatory	practices,	more	evident	in	the	public	
than	in	the	private	sphere	and	the	increased	agency	of	Dalits.	Women’s	collective	
agency	has	equally	increased.	Symbolic	change	has	affected	relations	among	
groups	in	the	public	sphere	(caste,	gender	and	other	forms	of	discrimination,	
social	rituals	etc.),	less	so	in	the	private	sphere.		
	
Alongside	the	politicisation	of	ethnicity	at	the	centre,	there	is	a	sense	that	local	
people	are	increasingly	aware	of	their	ethnic	identity	although	local	people	did	
not	speak	directly	about	affirmation	of	ethnic	identity	as	a	form	of	social	
transformation.		Despite	the	heated	scholarly	and	popular	debate	on	ethnic	
federal	structure,	affirmative	action,	ethnicity	based	political	mobilisations	and	
ongoing	politics	of	identity	in	the	centre	among	the	activists	and	pundits	and	
donor	agencies,	people	we	spoke	to	at	the	local	level	did	not	view	this	issue	as	a	
form	of	social	transformation.	However,	we	do	maintain	that	this	is	likely	to	
change	in	the	next	few	years	with	the	mass	politicisation	of	ethnicity	associated	
with	growth	and	expansion	of	organisations	and	networks.		
	
Labor	relations	in	rural	Nepal	have	undergone	major	changes	in	recent	decades	
accompanied	by	livelihood	diversification	and	multi‐locale	livelihoods	in	Nepal.		
Not	only	has	rural	to	urban	migration	emerged	as	an	important	part	of	
livelihoods,	rural	laboring	households	are	drawing	income	both	from	wage	labor	
in	agriculture	and	other	wage	labor	opportunities	that	have	emerged	locally.		
Bonded	or	attached	forms	of	patron‐client	caste	based	relations	have	
significantly	weakened.	Although	traditional	forms	of	semi‐feudal	labor	relations	
have	not	disappeared	completely	and	some	poorer	households	are	still	engaged	
in	semi‐feudal	and	caste‐based	labor	arrangements	in	agriculture,	there	is	clear	
evidence	of	increasing	numbers	of	laboring	households	involved	in	wage	labor	
within	or	outside	of	the	village.	Many	are	commuting	to	work	in	construction	and	
informal	sectors	in	nearby	villages	or	roadside	markets	and	cities.	The	changes	
in	rural	labor	is	evident	in	the	following	ways:	a)	diversification	of	rural	
livelihoods	from	land	and	agriculture‐based	to	non‐agricultural	and	non‐land	
based;	b)	gradual	weakening	of	traditional	systems	of	labor	arrangements	
including	caste‐based	division	of	labor;	c)	commodified	labor;	and	d)	widespread	
mobility	of	labor	both	within	and	outside	of	the	country.	Overall,	these	changes	
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indicate	a	clear	shift	in	the	social	and	economic	position	of	the	laboring	
population	from	subjects	to	citizens.		Such	change	has	increased	economic	and	
political	agency	of	the	laborers	and	laboring	households	but	is	not	free	from	
vulnerabilities	and	risks.	Despite	the	weakening	of	semi‐feudal	labor	relations,	
laboring	households	have	not	been	able	to	enhance	their	economic	status	on	a	
significant	or	a	sustainable	basis.	Compared	to	the	past,	wages	have	increased	
and	laboring	households	have	access	to	cash,	but	income	is	not	enough	to	meet	
subsistence	needs	as	the	sources	of	expenses	have	also	increased	and	so	has	
their	dependence	on	the	market.	Even	if	migrant	remittances	and	livelihood	
diversification	had	enabled	some	households	to	improve	their	socio‐economic	
position	in	the	community,	the	conditions	of	structural	violence	affecting	the	
majority	of	the	rural	poor	do	not	seem	to	have	changed	substantially.	
Nonetheless,	it	is	important	that	these	changes	are	acknowledged	and	their	
implications	discussed.	
	
So	far,	however,	it	would	seem	that	structural	underdevelopment	and	attendant	
economic	relations	have	not	changed	–	something	that	has	not	attracted	the	
attention	of	anthropologists	or	other	social	scientists	who	are	pre‐occupied	with	
Nepal’s	sedentary	and	timeless	imagination	or	who	have	more	recently	jumped	
on	to	the	ethnic	grievances	bandwagon.	The	concept	of	interregnum,	where	the	
old	is	dead	whereas	the	new	is	not	yet	born,	appropriately	highlights	the	current	
transition	in	Nepal	and	the	confusion	it	generates	in	the	minds	of	social	
scientists.		
	
Donor	complicity	
In	the	context	of	Nepal’s	struggle	for	peace,	democracy	and	stability	and	
‘democractization’	following	the	ten‐year	old	bloody	Maoist	insurgency,	
sentiments	relating	to	ethnicity	and	exclusionary	nature	of	Nepali	state	have	not	
only	been	only	picked	up	by	academic‐activists,	consultants	and	political	pundits,	
but	also	by	international	donors	and	their	NGO	counterparts	who	are	a	part	of	
the	same	epistemic	community	as	many	if	not	all	are	dependant	on	funding	from	
aid	agencies	to	support	their	research	and	thus	their	livelihoods	through	short‐
term	consulting	assignments.	The	criticism	against	the	complicit	academics	is	
not	just	because	many	promote	donor	interest	through	their	research,	but	more	
importantly	because	they	fail	to	critically	engage	on	the	most	critical	questions.		
For	these	reasons,	Nepal’s	case	offers	an	excellent	opportunity	to	interrogate	and	
critique	the	political	use	of	social	science	knowledge	by	agents	of	change	such	as	
powerful	European	donors	in	Kathmandu.	So	much	so	that	Nepal	ought	to	be	a	
case	study	for	investigating	how	social	science	can	do,	as	much	as	what	it	fails	to	
do.		
	
Let	us	consider	a	brief	account	of	a	DFID	supported	Janjati	Empowerment	
Programme	(JEP)	in	Nepal	that	met	with	resistance	and	counter‐resistance,	
leading	to	the	some	stark	criticisms	of	DFID’s	engagement	in	Nepal	eventually	
leading	to	its	withdrawal	of	support	for	JEP.	On	11	May	2011,	DFID	announced	
that	it	would	no	longer	continue	its	financial	support	to	NEFIN	(National	
Federation	of	Indigenous	Nationalities),	and	withdrew	a	support	of	NRs	110	
million	from	the	Janajati	Empowerment	Project	II	(JEP	II)	citing	violation	of	the	
terms	of	funding	between	DFID	and	NEFIN,	because	the	latter	had	been	
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continuously	involved	in	organizing	‘bandas’	(shutdowns).	Since	September	
2004,	DFID	had	provided	over	£	2	million	to	NEFIN	for	different	projects.	The	
Head	of	DFID‐Nepal	wrote	to	NEFIN	President	stating	“….	due	to	NEFIN’s	recent	
continued	involvement	in	supporting	the	27	April	‘banda’	and	based	on	
information	verified	with	you	that	NEFIN	is	part	of	a	wider	front	to	call	a	‘banda’	
on	May	13	(Friday)	to	protest	for	constitutional	rights	of	Janajati	and	wider	
people	from	the	marginalized	communities,	I	am	sorry	to	inform	you	that	DFID	
will	not	be	able	to	provide	any	further	funding	as	a	result.”	The	letter	further	
mentioned,	“…we	cannot	continue	our	support	to	organization	that	is	organizing	
‘banda’,	which	is	totally	against	Human	Rights.”		
	
This	particular	incident	helps	situate	complexities	involved	in	donor	support	in	
the	current	context	in	Nepal.	Responding	to	the	criticisms	that	aid	agencies	have	
historically	benefited	the	dominant	elite	and	helped	sustain	the	hegemony	of	the	
high	castes	rather	than	challenging	it,	several	aid	agencies	began	to	launch	
programmes	targeting	Dalits	and	ethnic	groups	from	the	early	2000s.		The	most	
controversial	among	them	has	been	DFID’s	funding	to	NEFIN	not	only	because	of	
the	incident	explained	above	but	also	because	there	is	a	strong	narrative,	
especially	among	the	high‐caste	elite,	that	donors	are	undermining	the	unitary	
nature	of	Nepali	State	and	are	considered	responsible	for	radicalizing	ethnicity,	
creating	divisions	and	fuelling	hatred	in	Nepal.		
	
Criticisms	of	donor	engagement	on	social	engineering	such	as	that	of	DFID	have	
met	with	nationalist	and	sovereignty	based	sentiments	that	are	reflected	in	the	
media	reporting	as	well	as	perception	and	everyday	resistance	of	Nepali	
bureaucracy	that	sees	DFID’s	engagement	as	promoting	ethnic	divisions	in	
Nepali	society	as	well	as	instability.	The	recent	visit	of	the	UK	Minister	for	
International	Development	in	July	2012	was	met	with	some	stiff	questioning	by	
journalists	on	DFID’s	role	in	stirring	ethnic	conflict	in	Nepal.		
	
One	of	the	key	criticisms	is	associated	with	donors’	engagement	on	the	issue	of	
ethnicity	and	ethnic	categories	in	their	attempt	to	promote	inclusion,	equality	
and	democracy.	The	work	of	donors	who	began	to	support	more	inclusive	
development	by	funding	targeted	programmes	ethnic	groups	has	come	under	
criticisms	from	certain	groups	who	argue	that	aid	agencies	have	helped	re‐affirm	
the	ethnic	identity	by	essentialising	categories.		Rather	than	‘class’	or	‘economic	
inequalities’,	donors	are	blamed	for	their	exclusive	focus	on	ethnicity,	and	
therefore	making	a	serious	‘mistake’.		
	
A	few	critics	see	the	declaration	of	Nepal	as	a	secular	state	and	a	federal	
democratic	republic	in	2008	as	the	work	of	donor	agencies.	They	argue	that	as	
the	monarchy	represented	the	protector	and	symbol	of	the	dominant	social	and	
religious	order,	for	those	interested	in	the	transformation	of	Nepali	society,	it	
was	an	obvious	move	to	dismantle	the	institution	that	was	seen	as	a	major	
obstacle	(Shah,	2008).	Citing	the	activities	of	evangelical	lobbyists	and	western	
embassies	based	in	Kathmandu	at	the	time	of	declaration	of	Nepal	as	secular	
state,	Shah	(2008:	17)	writes,	‘Although,	the	formal	rationale	has	been	to	
separate	the	state	from	Hindu	religion,	the	unstated	consideration	has	been	to	
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weaken	the	king	by	removing	the	symbolic	ties	between	the	Hindu	crown	and	
the	state.’			
	
Conclusion		
Apart	from	the	populist	commentary	and	activist	slogans,	there	has	been	very	
little	serious	academic	debate	on	most	significant	issues	such	as	ethnicity	and	
state	restructuring	in	Nepal.	Social	scientists	with	academic	authority	on	the	
subject	are	largely	silent	and	the	debate	in	the	public	sphere	is	largely	one	sided	
pushed	by	activists	and	donor	supported	political	pundits.	Silence	on	the	part	of	
the	social	scientists	ought	to	be	a	matter	of	concern	especially	in	a	context	where	
sociological,	historical	as	well	as	anthropological	knowledge	appears	to	be	
critical	in	shaping	the	political	debate	on	state	restructuring.	While	it	is	not	
desirable	for	social	scientists	to	engage	as	activists,	academic	silence	should	be	
unacceptable.	For	instance,	it	must	be	clear	to	the	scholars	of	Nepal	that	the	
nature	of	structural	violence	and	inequality	in	Nepal	is	not	all	about	‘ethnicity’	
and	it	cannot	be	dealt	within	the	framework	of	proposed	model	of	ethnic	
federalism.	There	is	no	denying	of	the	fact	that	Nepali	state	did	systematically	
marginalize	some	ethnic	groups	and	promoted	others.	But,	to	call	‘ethnic	
federalism’	a	solution	to	the	historical	mistakes	makes	very	little	sense,	not	only	
because	it	fails	to	understand	the	nature	of	social	exclusion	and	structural	
violence	in	Nepal,	but	also	because	it	has	a	real	potential	to	promote	political	
instability	and	ethnic	conflict	in	the	country.	The	nature	of	structural	violence	in	
Nepal	is	complex;	while	ethnicity	is	one	and	a	major	dimension	to	it,	it	is	not	the	
only	one.	In	fact,	it	is	the	livelihoods	where	structural	violence	is	most	violent;	
and	marginalized	populations	within	the	ethnic	groups	ought	to	get	attention	
than	a	particular	ethnic	category.		
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